SHARPE v. JOHNSTONE.
at common law, and independent of custom and usage, for remuneration by the
buyer for keeping? Apparently not.
The services in such case are rendered
not at the request, express or implied,
of the buyer, and not even for his benefit, except remotely. The goods are
kept and the expenses incurred solely for
tilebenefit of the seller, and adversely
rather than otherwise, to the interests
of the buyer. To compel him, therefore, to pay for them would be contrary
to every elementary principle. Certain
it is that in such cases the seller has no
lien on the goods for the expenses of
keeping, as he would have for the contract price. See British J'inpire Shipping Co. v. Senes, El., Bl. & El. 353,
affirmed in House of Lords, 8 H. L. 0.
338. And see Hartley v. Hitchcock, I
Stark. 408; McIntyre v. Carver, 2 W.
& S. 392.
The second question is, whether the
common law gives a person, who expends time and money on property which
he supposes to be his, any ground for remuneration from the real owner, when
once ascertained, and who thus usually
derives more or less benefit from the
other's expenditure. Probably this arises
most frequently in regard to real estate,
anl the rule seems to le well settled
that, at common law and independent
of statpte, the real owner is not liable.
And undoubtedly the result thus
reached led to the enactment of the
"betterment laws," as they are usually
termed, giving the party incurring the
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expense or making the improvements
upon real estate under a bona fide belief
of title some mode of redress, either by
way of lien or otherwise, against the real
owner, or at least against the property
itself.
But the common law, in such'cases,
not only did not create any implied contract or liability on the part of the real
owner, but even held him not bound by
his subsequent express promise to pay
for the improvements. Being rendered
without his request, express or implied,
they constituted a past or executed consideration, as it is called, and so the
promise was not legally supported:
Frear v. Hardenbergh, 5 Johns. 272.
Therefore, persons who take possession
ofgovernment land without right-squatters--cannot maintain an action to recover
of the rightful owner for the improvements made thereon, although the defendant has afterwards promised to pay
for them: Carson v. Clark, 1 Scam.
113; Hutson v. Orerturf, Id. 170;
.Roberts v. Garen, Id. 396 ; Townsend v.
Briggs, Id. 472 ; M31cFarland Y. .lfathis,
5 Eng. (Ark.) 560. If A. performs work
for B. on land owned by B.'s wife, but
solely on B.'s personal credit and not as
agent for his wife, and the wife subsequently gives her note for the labor, she
is not liable therefor, simply because the
work was not done at her request or by
her authority; Morse v. Mason, 103
Mass. 560.
ED3tUnD H. BENNETT.
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SHARPE v. JOHNSTONE.
In an action for malicious prosecution although it appears that the prosecutor
communicated to counsel all the facts and followed the latter's advice, yet if notwithstanding such advice he believed the prosecution must fail, and was actuated in
commencing it by a desire to injure and wrong the accused, he is liable.
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If there be reasonable or probable cause, no malice, however distinctly proved,
will make the defendant liable. Tie proof of malice does not establish the want
of probable cause, nor does the want of probable cause necessarily establish the
existence of malice. That is to say, malice is not an inference of law from the want
of probable cause.
Malice, however, may be inferred from th6 facts which go to establish the want
of probable cause, but this inference is a question of law for the court, and not a
question of fact for the jury.
Where the accused is discharged by the committing magistrate, and the prosecutor
afterwards procures him to be indicted fbr the same offence, the indictment is a
second and independent prosecution for which damages'may be recovered in addition
to those recovered for the first prosecution; but if the prosecutor is summoned
before the grand jury without his p'rocurement, he is not liable for damages as for a
second prosecution.
Where two indictments are successively found for the same offence, and on
account of some formal defect in the first it is quashed and the prisoner tried and
acquitted on the second, the two cannot, in an action for malicious prosecution, be
considered as two separate prosecutions.

FROM St. Louis Court of Appeals.

This was an action for malicious prosecution. The plaintiff in
1869 had entered into an arrangement with defendants, by which
defendants were to ship him mules which he was to sell, receiving
for his services one-third the net profits. After some time a settlement was had by which he was found indebted to defendants in
a certain sum, besides his one-third of whatever loss might be suffered by the non-payment of paper taken from' purchasers of the
imules. Afterwards a draft of one of these purchasers having gone
to protest plaintiff undertook its collection and did collect the
money, but refused to pay any of it to defendants, on the ground
that they had fraudulently invoiced mules to him at a larger price
than had been paid by them, and that they had sold some mule
sheds remaining on hand at the close of the adventure; at a price
much below the value. Defendants consulted counsel and instituted a criminal proceeding against plaintiff in the Court of Criminal
Correction, but plaintiff was discharged by the judge. Subsequently two indictments against plaintiff were successively found
by the grand jury upon the same charge. After both indictments
had been found the court quashed one and the plaintiff was tried
upon the other and acquitted. He then brought this suit against
defendants and filed a declaration containing a count on the prosecution in the Court of Criminal Correction and one on each of the
indictments. The case was tried and resulted in a verdict and
judgment for plaintiff which was reversed on appeal. See 59 Mo.
VOL. XX-X.73
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557, where the facts are fully reported. On the second trial the
court gave a number of instructions, all of which are sufficiently
stated in the opinion except the eighth instruction asked for by
plaintiff, which was as follows:
"Even if the jury should find that the defendants, prior to such
prosecutions, communicated to couns 1 learned in the law all the
fdcts, yet, nevertheless, if they should further find that such prosecutions were without probable cause and that such counsel were
not consulted by them in-good faith, but that defendants were actuated in consulting such counsel and in. commencing such prosecutions with angry passions and a hostile desire to injure and wrong
him, then the opinion and advice of such counsel is of no avail as
a defence in the cause."
The court also insrructed the jury that there might be a recovery
on each count of the declaration, notwithstanding that all the proceedings were for the same alleged offence.
The verdict and judgment was for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment,
whereupon plaintiff appealed to this court.
Martin &' Lackland, for appellants.

Henderson & Shields, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HOUGH, J.-This was an action for malicious prosecution, and

is the same case reported in 59 Mo. 557, where the facts are fully
stated, and it will be unnecessary to establish them in this opinion.
It will be proper to observe, however, that in the trial which took
place after the case was remanded by this court, the plaintiff re'covered judgment for $1500 on the first count, $3000 on the second count and $3000 on the third count; whereas, in the first
trial, the plaintiff recovered judgment for $6334.42 on the first
count, and judgment was rendered for the defendants on the second
and third counts. The first count was founded upon plaintiff's discharge by the committing magistrate, and the second and third
counts were founded upon proceedings had upon two indictments
found in the criminal court.
It is essential to a recovery in an action for malicious prosecution, that the prosecution should be ended, and that it should have
been instituted maliciously and without probable cause.
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When this case was here before, this court said: "If there be
reasonable or probable cause, no malice, however distinctly proved,
will make the defendant liable. The proof of malice does not
establish the want of probable cause, nor does the want of probable
cause necessarily establish the existence of malice. That is to say,
malice is not an inference of law from the want of probable cause.
Malice, however, need not be proved by direct and positive testimony, but may be inferred from the facts, which go to establish the
want of probable cause, and this is all that is meant when it is said
that malice may be inferred from the want of probable cause :" 59
Mo. 575-6.
In the case of VTan Sickle v. Brown, 68 Mo. 627, probable cause
was defined as follows: "In our opinion, that reasonable and probable cause which will relieve a prosecutor from liability is, a belief
by him in the guilt of the accused, based upon circumstances sufficiently strong to induce such belief in the mind of a reasonable'
and cautious man :" 68 Mo. 635.
It. may be further observed that the action of a grand jury in
finding a bill of indictment, or the commitment of the prisoner by
the examining magistrate, is prima facie evidence of probable
cause: igharp v. Johnstone, 59 Mo. 558; Van Sickle v. Brown,
supra; State v. Bailey, 35 Mo. 168; Brant v. Higgins, 10 Id.
728; C-raham v. Noble, 13 Serg. 233; Bacon v. Town, 4 Cush.
217.
On the other hand the refusal of the committing magistrate to
bind the defendant over, has been said by this court to be very persuasive evidence that the prosecution was without probable cause:
Sharp v. Johnstone, supra; Capqrson v. Sproule, 39 Mo. 39;
Brant v. iliggins, 10 Id. 728.
When an indictment has been found by the grand jury, or the
defendant has been committed by the examining 'magistrate, this
prima facie evidence of probable cause may be rebutted, or overthrown by evidence showing that such indictment, or commitment,
'was obtained by false or fraudulent testimony, or other improper
means, or by evidence showing that the prosecutor, notwithstanding the action of the grand jur y or the committing magistrate, did
not himself believe the defendant to be guilty.
When the examining magistrate refuses to commit, and it is
thus determined that there is no probable cause for the prosecution,
any inference of malice which may be drawn from such fact, will
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be overcome by showing that the prosecutor, having fully informed
himself as to all ascertainable facts bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff, and having fully and fairly communicated
the same to reputable counsel, instituted the prosecution under the
opinion of such counsel, that the plaintiff was legally subject to a
criminal charge, and himself believed such advice to I e correct and
that the plaintiff was guilty. This is what is meant by consulting
counsel and instituting the prosecution in good faith.
, Before proceeding to examine, in the light of these general principles, the instructions given and refused by the trial court, the
verdict in the case as now presented renders it necessary for us to
determine whether there could, in any event, be a recovery on each
count of the petition, it being conceded that the two indictments
were for the same offence charged before the committing magistrate.
In the case of Bacon v. Towne et al., 4 Cush. 217, it appeared
that the plaintiff was bound over by the committing magistrate,
and was subsequently indicted by the grand jury, but in consequence of a defect in the indictment the public prosecutor entered
a nolle prosequi thereon, and forthwith another indictment was laid
before the grand jury and was found upon the evidence already
given; upon which last indictment the plaintiff was tried and acquitted, and he thereupon instituted an action for malicious prosecution. SHAW, 0. J., delivered the opinion of the court, holding
that there was a single continuous prosecution which was not ended
until the plaintiff was acquitted on the second indictment. The
case at bar is distinguishable from that case in this : In the case
at bar the first prosecution was ended when the plaintiff was
discharged by the examining magistrate. When the prisoner is discharged by the examining magistrate, the law does not require that
the examination taken by. him shall be certified and delivered to
the clerk of the court having cognisance of tbh offence charged, to
be laid before the grand jury. It is only when the prisoner is
bound over that this is required to be done : ch. 111, art. 2, §§ 25,
27, 33, W., S. So that if the prosecutor should, after the discharge
of the prisoner, voluntarily appear, or cause himself to be summoned, before the grand jury and 'procure the prisoner to be indicted for the same offence charged before the magistrate, this
would be the institution of a second and independent prosecution
for which he could be held liable, if he acted maliciously and without probable cause. 'But if, in such case, the prosecutor should not
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voluntarily appear, but sh*ould be summoned- before the grand jury
without his own procurement, he would not be liable to an action,
unless the testimony given by him, on which the plaintiff was indicted and arrested was false or fraudulent. And we are further
of opinion that when two indictments are found by the grand jury
for the same offence, and the second indictment is preferred solely
on account of some formal defect in the first, and the first is thereby
suspended and is quashed, no action for malicious prosecution can
be based upon .the order of the court discharging the prisoner from
the first indictment. Even if the first indictment had been quashed
before the second indictment was found, and the criminal court had
committed or recognised the plaintiff to answer a new indictment,
as it might have done (sect. 1986, Rev. Stat.), such second indictment could not be regarded as the institution of a new prosecution,
but as a continuation of the proceedings under the first indictment.
The third instruction asked by the defendants was as follows:
If the jury believe there was reasonable cause for the prosecution, no malice, however distinctly proved, will make defendants
liable in this action, and the proof of want of probable cause does
not necessarily establish the existence of malice; that is to say,
malice is not an inference of law from the want of probable cause,
and the jury cannot infer malice unless the facts attending the
conduct and determination of the prosecutions, and those adduced
to establish the want of probable cause, are of a characterto warrant such inference.
This instruction is in the language of the opinion delivered by
this court, when the case was first here. It was given by the court,
with the exception of that portion in italics, and that was properly
omitted, as the context of the opinion from which it was taken
shows that it was intended by this court as a direction to trial courts
in giving instructions in regard to the inference of malice from the
want of probable canse. It should not be embodied in an instruction for the reason that it involves a question of law. Whether the
facts aie such as to warrant an inference of malice, is a question of
law for the court. We see no material error in the instructions
given by the court, so far as the first count is concerned. Under
the view we take of the case additional instructions should have
been given applicable to the counts based upon the prosecutions
under the indictments.
Instruction number eight given for the plaintiff has been sharply
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criticised by the defendant's counsel, and has been declared 'to be
erroneous by the court of appeals. We have the same opinion,
however, in regard to this instruction, now, which we had when this
. case was first here, and treating it as applicable alone to the first
count, as it was treated on the record then before us, we think it
correct.
The advice of counsel cannot accurately be said to amount to
probable cause, in the face of the judgment of the magistrate discharging the prisoner.
The discharge of the plaintiff by the committing magistrate was
primafacie evidence of a want of probable cause, although counsel may have advised that plaintiff was liable to a criminal charge;
.and although the defendants may have communicated to counsel
learned in the law, all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the
,guilt or innocence of the plaintiff, which they knew, or by reasonable diligence could have ascertained, yet if, notwithstanding the
advice of counsel, they believed that the prosecution must fail, and
they were actuated in commencing said prosecution, not simply by
.angry passions or hostile feelings, but by a desire to injure and
wrong the plaintiff, then most certainly, they could not be said to
have consulted counsel in good faith, and the jury would have been
warranted in finding that the prosecution was malicious. This is
what we think the 8th instruction means.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment
of the Circuit Court and remanding the case will be affirmed.
All concur except Judge RAY, absent.
The importance to the legal profession of the decision in the principal
case lies in its clear and explicit statement of the extent to which, and the
real grounds upon whith, the advice
of counsel will constitute a good defence
-to an action for malicious prosecution.
Concisely stated, the court decides that
the advice of counsel will not prevail as
p absolute defence, where actual malice
is found by the jury. The correctness
of the decision rests upon the strength
of the position taken by the court, that
the advice of counsel given upon a full
and complete statement of all the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
is a defence ouly so far as it operates as,

a rebuttal of the presumptive malice,
which the jury may infer from the proof
of want of probable cause, and that it
cannot, therefore, establish a conclusive
presumption of probable cause.
It is remarkable with what uncertainty
the books speak of the manner in which
the advice of counsel constitutes a defence. Some of the cases hold that it is
proof of probable cause (Ross v. Innis,
26 Ill. 259 ; Potter v. Seale, 8 Cal.
217; Hewlett Y. Cruchley, b Taunt.
277; Levy v. Brannan, 39 Cal. 485;
Besson v. Soutthard, 10 N. Y. 236;
illurray v.
cLane, 2 Car. Law Rep.
186 ; Fisher v. Forrester, 33 Penn. St.
501; Le Afaistre v. Hunter, Bright. 495 ;
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Olmstead v. Partridge, 16 Gray 383;
Laughlin v. Clawson, 27 Penn. St. 330).
Some maintain that it disproves malice,
in most cases imposing no limitation
upon its scope (Snow v. Allen, I
Stark. 409 ; Xurphy v. Larson, 77 Ill.

proceeding maliciously and without probable cause. It may be erroneous, but
the client is not responsible for the error.
He is not the insurer of his lawyer.
Whether the facts amount to probable
cause is the very question submitted to

172 ; Center v. Spring, 2 Clarke 393;
Sommer v. Wilt, 4 S. & R. 20 ; Stanton
v. Hart, 27 Mlich. 539; Williams v.
V'an Ofeter, 8 lo. 339; Davenport v.
Lynch, 6 Jones L. 545 ; Rover v. Webster, 3 Clarke 502), while others, and
it is believed the majority of the cases,
refer to it as establishing, both the
absence of malice and the presence of a
probable cause (Wilhinson v. Arnold,
11 Ind. 45 ; Gould v. Gardner, 8 La.
Ann. 11 ; Bliss v. Wyman, 7 Cal. 257 ;
Bartlett v. Brown, 6 RI. I. 37 ; Walter
v. Sample, 25 Penn. St. 275 ; Ames v.
Rathbun, 55 Barb. 194 ; Blunt v. Little,
3 Mason 102; Phillips v. Bonham, 16
La. Ann. 387; Chandler v. McPherson,
11 Ala. 916 ; Turner v. Walker, 3 G.
& J. 380; Lemay v. Williams, 32 Ark.
166 ; Palmer v. Richardson, 70 Ill. 545 ;
Wood v. Weir, 5 B. Mon. 544; Wicker
v. Hotchkiss, 62 Ill. 107 ; Davie v.
Wisher, 72 Id. 262 ; Skidmore v. Bricker,
77 Id. 164; Soule v. Winslow, 66 Me.
447).

counsel in such cases; and when the
client is instructed that they do, he has
taken all the precaution demanded of a
good citizen."
Judge CooLr.,
in his
work on Torts, p. 183, under the head
of malicious prosecutions, says: "It
may, perhaps, turn out that the cornplainant, instead of relying upon his own
judgment, has taken the advice of counsel learned in the law, and acted upon
that. This should be safer and more
reliable than his own judgment, not only
because it is the advice of one who can
view the facts calmly and dispassionately,
but because he is capable of judging of
A
the facts in their legal bearings.
prudent man is, therefore, expected to
take such advice, and when he does so,
and places all the facts before his counsel, anl acts upon his opinion, proof of
the fact makes out a case of probable
cause, provided the disclosure appears to
have been full and fair, and not to have
withheld any of the material facts."
And in the principal case, when it was

hr. Justice SToRY in the case of
Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason 102, said :
"It is certainly going a great way to
admit the evidence of any counsel that
he advised a suit upon a deliberate cxamination of the facts, for the purpose
of repelling the imputation of malice and
establishing probable cause.
Mly opinion, however, is that such evidence is
admissible, although it is sometimes open
to the objections stated in Hewlett v.
Urutehley, supra."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
in Walter v. Sample, 25 Penn. St. 275,
expresses itself thus: "Professors of the
law are the proper advisers of men in
doubtful circumstances, and their advice,
when fairly obtained, exempts the party
who acts upon it from the imputation of

for the first time before the Supreme
Court (see 59 Mlo. 577), Judge HoUGi
said: "The
advice of counsel will
not amount to probablecause, when the
prosecutor resorts to such advice only as
a cloak for his malice.
He must consult
counsel in good faith, and it is not only
his duty to make himself acquainted with
all ascertainable facts having a bearing
upon the supposed offence, but he must
communicate all such facts to his counsel, however immaterial he may deem
them to be."
In an early case, Sommer
v. Wilt, 4 S. & R. 20, Judge DuN-CAe,
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
said : "If this act had proceeded from
ignorance or mistake of the law on a
fair representation of facts to the attorney, I would not impute the honest mis.
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take of a professor of the law to malice in
the client; for here would be innocence
which would strip the ceise of its malignant qualities, and would, as I rather
incline to consider the law, be a defence
in the action."
These citations suffice to show that the
courts apparently have as yet a confused
idea of the ground upon which the advice
of counsel furnishes a defence to an
action for malicious prosecution. If the
advice of eunsel, when given upon a
fair and complete statement of all the
facts bearing upon the case that are
within the knowledge of the prosecutor
proves the existence of probable cause,
then it furnishes a complete bar to the
action, whatever may have been the
motive which induced the proceeding.
The most positive and venomous malice
will not render the prosecutor liable, if
he can establish probable cause for the
prosecution.
As is generally stated in all the cases
upon this subject, malice and want of
probable cause must co-exist to found an
action for malicious prosecution. Although the malice need not be directly
and affirmatively proved, but may be
inferred from the want of probable
cause (Pangburn v. Ball, I Wend.
345 ; Vhitev. Tucker, 16 Ohio St. 468;
Ammerman v. Crosby, 26 Ind. 451
Cooper v. Utterbach, 37 Md. 282; Blass
v. Gregor, 15 La. Ann. 121 ; .31cKown
v. Hnter, 30 N. Y. 625 ; Willans v.
Taylor, 6 fBing. 183; Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209 ; Purcell v. Acamara,
9 East 361 ; M51owry v. Whipple, 8 R.
1. 360 ; Harpham v. Whitney, 77 I1.
32; 1flickinger v. Wagner, 46 Md. 581;
Merriam Y. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439
Dietz v. Langfitt, 63 Penn. St. 234;
Schofield v. Ferrers, 47 Id. 194; Paukett v. Livermore, 5 Clarke 277 ; Garrison v. Pearce, 4 E. D. Smith 255;
Cecil v. Clarke, 17 Md. 508 ;Harkrader
v. M3[oore, 44 Cal. 144; Holliday v.
Sterling, 62 Mo. 321 ; Savil v. Roberts,
I Salk. 14, 15; Ewing v. Sanford, 19

Ala. 605) ; the. want of probable cause
cannot be inferred, but must be proven
affirmatively and independently of the
presence 'of actual malice : Travis v.
Smith, 1 Penn. St. 234; Willans v.
Taylor, 6 Bing. 183, 186; illitchinson
Cross, 58 Ill.366 ; Xalone ". Mfurphy,
2 Kans. 250; Hall v. Hawkins, 5
Iumph. 357 ; Cloon v. Gerry, 13 Gray
201 ; Israel v. Brooks, 23 Il1. 575;
Flickinger v. Wagner, 46 Md. 581;
Wade v. Walden, 23 Ill.425 ; Chapman
v. Cawrey, 50 Id. 512 ; Sappinyton v.
Watson, 50 Mo. 83 ; Callahan v. Caffarata, 39 Id. 136; Casperson v.
Sproule, 39 Id. 39 ; Foshay v. Ferguson,
2 Dnio 617; Heyne v. Blair, 62 N. Y.
19, 22 ; Hurd v. Shaw, 20 Ill. 354 ;
Bell v. Pearcy, 5 Ired. 83; Center v.
Spring, 2 Clarke 393 ; Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen 393 ; Kirug v. Ward, 77
Ill. 603; Skidmore v. Bricker, 77 Id.
164.
Probable cause, as defined by the Supreme Court of the United States, is
"the existence of such fads and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within
the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the
crime, for which he was prosecuted :"
Wheeler v. Aresbitt, 24 How. (U. S.)
545. ' See, also, Broad v. .BHim, 5 Bing.
(N. C.) 722; Faris v. Starke, 3 B.
Mon. 4; Farnam v. Feeley, 56 I. Y..
451 ; Barron v. fason, 31 Vt. 189 ;
Ibgnan v. Knox, 66 N. Y. 525 ; Shaul
v. Brown, 28 Iowa 37; s. c. 4 Am.
Rep. 151 ; Braveboy v. Ccelfield 2
Me-,%ul. 270 ; Winebiddle v. Porterfield,
9 Penn. St. 137 ; Gallaway v. Burr, 32
Mich. 332; Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush.
217 ; Collins v. Hayte, 50 Ill.353;
Gee v. Patterson, 63 Me. 49 ; Lawrence
v. Lanning, 4 Ind. 194; Carl v. Ayers,
53 N. Y. 14; Spengler v. Davy, 15
Grat. 381 ; 1owry v. Whipple, 8 R. I.
360; Baner v. Clay, 8 Kans. 580;
Boyd v. Cross, 35 Md. 194; Jacks V.
Stimpson, 13 Ill.701 ; Travis v, Smith,
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i Penn. St. 234 ; Stone v. Stevens, 12
Conn. 219 ; Hall v. Suydam, 6 Barb.
83; Raulston v. Jackson, 1 Sneed 128.
Probable cause does not rest upon the
sincerity of the prosecutor's belief, nor
upon its reasonableness, as shown by
facts which are calculated to influence
his judgment, peculiarly, and not the
judgment of others. It must be established by facts, which re likely to induce
any reasonable man to believe that the
person is guilty of the alleged crime. It
is not affected by the individual belief or
unbelief of the prosecutor. Although
his ho:rest belief in the guilt of the accused is necessary to shield him from a
judgment for malicious prosecution, it is
not because such belief is necessary to
establish probable cause, but because its
absence proves that the prosecution was
instituted for the gratification of his
malicious feelings towards the accused.
Tile definition cited in the principal case
with approval from Van Sickle v.
Brown, 68 Mlo. 627, that " that reasonable and probable cause, which will
relieve a prosecutor from liability, is a
belief by him in the guilt of the accused,
based upon circumstances sufficiently
strong to induce such belief in the mind
of a reasonable and cautious man," is a
loose and unguarded statement of what
constitutes " probable cause," and is
calculated to mislead in the settlement
of the effect of professional advice upon
the establishment of probable cause.
Perhaps to this very misapprehension of
the meaning of "probable cause" may
be traced the common error as to the
manner in which the advice of counsel
affords a defence, and which the principal case undertakes to correct. If probable cause depends upon the honest
reasonable belief of the prosecutor in the
guilt of the accused, it is certainly based
upon reasonable grounds, if his legal
adviser tells him he has a good cause of
action. He has a right to presume that
an attorney, an officer of the court, is
skilled in the law, and is better able to
VOL. XXX.-74

judge of the probability of the cause
than he. But his belief does not enter
into the determination of the question
of probable cause. It is not established
when it is shown that the facts and circumstances of the case were sufficient to
make the prosecutor's belief reasonable;
it must be shown that as a matter of law
they were sufficient to induce in any
reasonably prudent man the belief, that a
good cause of action exists. Ifthat be the
true definition, and it is fully established
by the cases cited supra, the advice of
counsel certainly cannot furnish a conclusive presumption of probable cause.
His opinion cannot be binding upon the
court, nor is it such a fact, standing
alone, which would induce any reasonably prudent man to believe in the commission of the offlence. The faith and
confidence reposed by the prosecutor in
the counsel, might make if reasonable
for him to believe in the existence of
probable cause, but it is not a fact which
would be capable of supplanting the
judgment of the court ; although such
an opinion, given by able and learned
counsel in a case of doubtful circumstances, would be entitled to its proper
weight as argument. As Mr. Justice
STORY says: "What

constitutes a pro-

bable cause of action is, when the facts
are given, matter of law upon which the
court is to decide; and it cannot be
proper to introduce certificates of counsel
to establish what the law is :" Blunt v.
Little, 3 Mason 102. Probable cause is
a question of law to be determined by
the court upon the facts of the case : Israel v. Brooks, 23 Ill. 575 ; Garrison v.
Pearce, 4 E. D. Smith 255 ; Greenwade
v. .3tills,'31 Mliss. 464 ; Busst v. Gibbons, 6 H. & N. 912 ; Ulmer v. Leland,
1 Mc. 135; Cloon v. Gerry, 13 Gray
201 ; Boyd v. Cross, 35 Mld. 194 ; I17ade
v. Walden, 23 I1. 425 ; M1asten v. Deyo,
2 Wend. 424 ; MC Williams V. Hoban,
42 Mld. 56 ; Center v. Spring, 2 Clarke
h93; Chapman v. Cawrey, 50 Ill. 512 ;
Pangburn v. Bull, 1 Wend. 345; Sweet
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v.Negus, 30 Mich. 406 ; Besson v. South-

ticriminal to justice: T'heeler v. Aresbitt,

ard, 10 N. Y. 236 ; Waldheim v. Sichel,
1 Hilton 45 ; Cooper v. Waldron, 50 Ale.
80 ; Speck v. Judson, 63 Id. 207 ; Kidder v. Parkhurst, 3 Allen 393 ; Thompson v. Force, 65 Ill. 370 ; Harkraderv.
.31oore, 44 Cal. 144; Swaim v. Stafford,
4 Ired. 392. But if the facts are in dispute, so that the question of probable
cause becomes a mixed one of law and
fact, it must be given to the jury to determine upon proper instructions from
the court: Garrison v. Pearce, 3 E. D.
Smith 255 ; Humphries v. Parker, 52
Ale. 502; Ulmer v. Leland, 1 Me. 135
Greenwade v. Mills, 31 Miss. 464;
Heyne v. Blair, 62 N. Y. 19 ; Besson v.
Southard, 10 N. Y. 236 ; IValdheim v.
Sichel, 1 Hilton 45 ; Cole v. Curtis, 16
Miun. 182; Driggs v. Burton, 44 Vt.
124 ; Sims v. McLendon, 3 Strobh. 557.
The advice of counsel, therefore, is
only so far a good defence, as it tends
to prove the honesty of the prosecutor's
belief in the guilt of the accused. And
the honesty of his belief only has weight
as evidence of the purity and legality of
his motives in commencing the prosecution. If the want of probable cause is
shown, it is a rule of law that the jury
may infer malice from the groundlessness
of the cause, and are-not obliged to find
actual malice in order to bring in a verdict of guilty: Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B.
& A. 588; Burhaus v. Sanford, 19
Wend. 417 ; M3unns v. Dupont, 3 Wash.
C. C. 31 ; ANicholson v. Coghill, 4 B. &
C. 21 ; Harphamn v. Whitney, 77 Ill.
'32 ; Green v. Cochran, 43 Iowa 544 ;
Center v. Spring, 2 Clarke 393; Barron
v. fason, 31 -Vt. 189 ; Page v. Cushing,
38 Me. 523. The jury may presume
that the institution of a prosecution without probable cause, proceeded from
malice and a desire to injure the accused. But it is not a conclusive presumption. It is possible to rebut it by
the proof of any facts which tend to
show that the prosecutor was actuated
solely by the laudable motive of bringing

24 How. (U. S.) 544 ; Barron v. Mason,
31 Vt. 189 ; Scanlan v. Cowley, 2 Hilton 489; Center v. Spring, 2 Clarke
393; Besson v. Southard, 10 NO.Y. 236;
Hayes v. Hayman, 20 La. Ann. 336;
Lyon v. H1ancock, 35 Cal. 372 ; Blass v.
Such a fact
Gregor, 15 La. Ann. 421.
is tile advice of counsel that there exists
a good cause of action. " Every miin
of common information, is presumed to
know that it is not safe in matters of importance, to trust to the legal opinions
of any but recognised lawyers; and no
matter is of more legal importance than
private reputation and liberty. When
a person resorts to the best means in his
power for information, it will be such a
proof of honesty as will disprove malice
and operate as a defence proportionate
Judge CAMPBELL'S
to his diligence."
opinion in Stanton v. Hart, 27 'ich,
539. It is only, however, as evidence
of his good motives, in rebuttal to the
inference of malice from the want of
probable cause, that it will prevail as a
defence. It does not constitute a conclusive presumption of good faith on the
part of the prosecutor. If, therefore,
there are facts, as in the principal case,
which establish the existence of malice
and show that the procurement of professional opinion was to cloak his malice,
or, as a matter of precaution, to learni
whether it was safe to commence pro
ceedings, the defence will not prevail
Glascock v. Bridges, 15 La. Ann. 672;
Chapman v. Dodd, 10 Minn. 350 ; Bur.
nap v. Albert, Taney 344; Ames v
Rathbun, 55 Barb. 194; Rover'. Web
ster, 3 Clarke 502 ; Davenport v. Lynch,
6 Jones L. 545 ; Fisher v. Forrester, 33
Penn. St. 501; Kimball v. Bates, 50
Mle. 308 ; Brown v. Randall, 36 Conn.
56; Prough v. Entriken, 11 Penn. St.
81; Schmidt Y. Weidman, 63 Id. 173 ;
Krug v. Ward,77 Ill. 603. In Snow
v. Allen, I Stark. 409, one of the earliest cases in which the advice of counsel
was set up as a defence, Lord ErLLx-
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inquired: " How can it be
contended here that the defendant acted
maliciously?
He acted ignorantly."
* * * "He was actihg under what he
thought was good advice; it was unfortunate that his attorney was misled by
Higgen's Case, Cro. Jac. 320; but
unless you can show that the defendant
was actuated by some purposed malice,
the plaintiff cannot recover."
In order that the advice of counsel
may furnish a counter-presumption to
the inference of malice from the want of
probable cause, sevcral requirements
must have been satisfied. In the first
place, the opinion must have been given
after a full and complete statement of
all the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, which bear upon the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Says Mr.
JnsticC STORY: "It appears to me that
a necessary qualification of the admission
is, that it should appear in proof that
the opinion of counsel is fairly asked
upon the real facts and not upon statements which conceal the truth or misrepresent the cause of action. If the
law were otherwise, nothing would
be more easy than to shelter the most
malicious prosecutions under the opinion
of counsel, honestly given, but under a
total mistake of the facts. Probable
cause of action in the opinion of counsel
must depend upon the facts which are
brought before him; and if the whole
facts which are material to form such
opinion are not presented to the mind,
how can the court say that he has given
any opinion as to the true cause of
action ?1"Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason 102.
See also, Chandler v. jMePherson, 11
Ala. 916; Sharp v. Johnston, 59 Mo.
557; Ross v. Ainis, 35 Ill. 487 ; Aldridge v. Churchill, 28 Ind. 62; Turner
v. Wfralker, 3 Q. & J. 380; Walter v.
Sample, 25 Penn. St. 275 ; Skidmore v.
Bricker, 77 Ill. 164; Potter Y. Seale, 8
Cal. 217 ; Lemay v. Williams, 32 Ark.
166; Phillips v. Bonham, 16,La. Ann.
3$7; Wicker v. Botc'diss, 62 1ll. 107 ;
]BOROUGH

|Vood v. Weir, 5 B. Mon. 544; Hill v.
Palm, 38 Mlo. 13; Fisher v. Forrester,
33 Penn. St. 501; Soule v. Winslow, 66
Mle. 447 ; Cooper v. Utterbach, 37 Md282; Hall v. Suydam, 6 Barb. 83;
Thompson v. Lumley, 50 How. Pr. 105.
In the ascertainment and presentation
to counsel of the facts of the case, the
prosecutor is required to exercise the
utmost diligence. And if there were
facts undiscovered, which by due care
could have been ascertained, or not disclosed to counsel because the prosecutor
did not deem them material, it would
have the same effect upon the value of
the legal opinion as if they had been corruptly and wilfully concealed : Sappington v. Watson, 50 Mo. 83 ; Levy v. Brannan, 39 Cal. 485; Stevens v. Fassrit, 27
Me. 266 ; Hill v. Palm, 38 Mo. 13;
Sharp v. Johnston, 59 Id. 557 ; Hewlett v. Cruchdey, 5 Taunt. 277 ; Bliss v.
Wljman, 7 Cal. 257 ; Thompson v. Alussey, 3 Greenl. 305 ; Scotten v. Longfellow,
40 Ind. 25; Galloway v. Stewart, 49
Id. 156.
It must be shown that the person upon
whose opinion the defendant relied was
a regular, practising attorney at law.
" To permit the counsel of those whose
capacity we have no means of judging,
and who owe no responsibility to the
courts, to be received as evidence, would
lead to collusion and furnish a ready
defence in all actions like the present:"
Williams v. Van Meter, 8 MNo. 339.
The real ground for this limitation of
the doctrine is that by seeking the counsel of others than attorneys duly authorized to practice law, the prosecutor has
not exercised that care and precaution
which is required of him before endangering the reputation and liberty of a
"The persons, to consult whom
citizen.
is the duty of a party, who conceives
himself aggrieved and is about to institute a criminal prosecution, are gentlemen of the legal profession and not those
who, in point of qualification to advise
upon such questions, stand no higher
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than that party himself."
x. Justice
STORY, in Blunt v. Little, sipra. See
also, Olmstead v. Partridge, 16 Gray
381 ; .lurphy v. Larson, 77 I1. 172 ;
Stanton v. Hart, 27 M\ich. 539; Beal v.
1obeson, 8 Ired. 276 ; Burgett v. Burgett, 43 Ind. 78 ; Straus v. Young, 36
Md. 246. Justices of the peace and all
other persons who are not regularly admitted to the bar as attorneys and counsellors, are generally held to be incompetent advisers for the purpose of affording protection against the action for
such malicious prosecution : Sutton v. A&fConnell, 46 Wis. 269 ; Olmstead v. Partridge, 16 Gray 381 ; 21rphy v. Larion,
77 Ill. 172, and cases cited in the preceding note. But in Philadelphia it has
been held that a city alderman, as the
conservator or justice of the peace, is
capable of advising parties in such cases,
and such advice will afford a defence to
the imputation of malice: Thomas v.
Painter, 10 Phila. 409 ; Rosenstein v.
!,eigel, 6 Phila. 532. This has not yet
been passed upon by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania: Bernar v. Dunlap, 13
Norris 329.
It has also'been held in a late case in
the Supreme Court of Maine, White v.
Carr, 71
cIe.558, that the opinion of
counsel will not avail as a defence if the
counsel is jointly interested with the
prosecutor in the prosecution. This
seems to be a very proper limitation.
For it has been repeatedly held, that if
counsel expresses doubt as to the existence of probable cause, or acts in bad
faith in collusion with the client, the
advice will be no defence: Kendrick- v.
Cypert, 10 Humph. 291 ; Stone v. Sw ft,
4 Pick. 389 ; Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn.
182 ; Center v. Spring, 2 Clarke 393.

If the attorney is interested in the conviction of the alleged criminal, he certainly is not competent to give an unbiased opinion upon the question of
probable cause.

His judgment is very

likely to be swayed by personal interest.
If, however, the prosecutor is ignorant
of the fact, it will not affect the honesty
of the prosecutor's belief or his good
faith more than any other improper motive of counsel, if not shared in by the
client: Burnap v. Albert, Taney 244.
Finally, the defendant must have acted
in good faith upon 'the advice received.
He must not only believe that lie has a
good cause of action when he commences
the proceedings (Ravenga v. ifacintosh,
2 B. & C. 693 ; Thompson v. Lumley,
50 How. Pr. 108; Potter v. Seale, 8
Cal. 217 ; Hall v. Suydam, 6 Barb. 83 ;
Anderson v. Friend, 71 Ill. 475), but he
must continue to do so throughout the
entire course of the proceedings. If,
subsequently, facts are discovered which
throw new light upon the case, or he obtains a contrary opinion from some other
attorney, either of which being sufficient
to induce a reasonably prudent man to
doubt the justice of his cause, the prosecutor is not permitted to rely any further
upon the counsel's opinion. It will protect him as to all steps taken in the
prosecution before the discovery of the
new facts; but he must discontinue the
proceedings or communicate them to the
counsel; and if counsel still advises him
that he has a good cause, he may proceed in the prosecution, and such subsequent advice will protecthim : Stone v.
Swjft, 4 Pick. 389 ; Cole v. Curtis, 16
Minn. 182; Center v. Spring, 2 Clarke
393; Ash v. 111arlow, 20 Ohio St. 119.
C. G. TIEDEMAN.
Columbia, Mo.
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Supreme Court of Illinois.
MADELAINE ROTH v. FREDERICK ERMAN

ET AL.

The courts of a state in which a marriage valid by its laws is contrdeted between
subjects of foreign states, will give effect to a subsequent decree of the court of the
foreign state of which the husband was a. subject, annulling the marriage on the
ground that it had been contracted without the consent of the sovereign of such
foreign state, it appearing that at the time of the decree of nullity both parties had
returned to such foreign state and were within the jurisdiction of the court pronouncing the decree.
R., a subject of the Kingdom of Wurtemberg, came to Illinois and there married
without first obtaining the permission of the king of Wurtemberg. A statute of
Wurtemberg declared that all marriages of its subjects without such precedent royal
consent should be null and void, whether celebrated at home or abroad. R. returned
with his wife to Wurtemberg, and in a suit, in which both parties appeared, a court
there entered a decree annulling the marriage for want of such consent. Subsequently R. married a second wvife, and died. In a suit to determine the right of the
first wife to dower in property in Illinois: Held, that although the marriage in
Illinois was valid, the decree of the court of Wurtemberg annulling it must be
accepted as having destroyed the marital status resulting from that marriage, and
that the first wife therefore had no right of dower.

APPEAL from a decree of the Superior Court of Cook county,
dismissing a bill filed to obtain partition of an estate. The facts
were as follows:
John George Roth, a subject of the Kingdom of Wurtemberg,
came to this country and settled in Chicago at an early day, and
there accumulated a large amount of property, consisting chiefly

of real estate, which is the subject of controversy in this suit.
In 1855 he married, in Chicago, Madelaine Moser, a native and
subject of France. In 1856 they returned to Europe, and on
their arrival in that country, or shortly afterwards, a separation
took place between them, resulting in her returning to reside with
her father in Alsace, France, her former domicile and residence,
and in his establishing a new residence in Schorndorf, in the Kingdom of Wurtemberg, where he continued to reside until the time

of his death, on July 12th 1876.

In 1862 his wife returned to

this country and instituted proceedings for a divorce. She was
shortly afterwards followed by her husband, and through his

influence induced to abandon the divorce suit and return with
him to Schorndorf, where they again resumed marital relations,

which were continued until October 1870, when he commenced
legal proceedings in the proper court at their domicile in Wurtemberg, to procure a decree of nullity of their marriage on the ground

ROTH v. EHMAl1.

that it had been entered into on his part in violation of the laws
of the Kingdom of Wurtemberg, of which he was at that time a
subject. On the 24th of April, 1873, the cause was brought to
a final hearing, both parties being present and represented by
their respective counsel, resulting in a decree declaring the marriage a nullity on the ground just stated. The court in which
the decree was rendered had jurisdiction both of the parties and
the subject-matter of the suit, and under the laws of Wurtemberg
had full power and competent authority to enter the decree. On
the 9th of September following, in consideration of 68000 in U.
S. bonds paid to her by Roth, Madelaine, his former wife, released
to him all her interests, whatever they might be, in the property
in controversy. On the 27th of November following, Roth contracted a second marriage with Amelia Staehle, who now claims
the estate in controversy. After the marriage of Amelia and
Roth, on the 28th of March 1874, they entered into an agreement
known to the laws of Wurtemberg as a "marriage and inheritance
contract," by which it was provided they were to hold the property
belonging to them respectively during their joint lives as common
property, with the right of survivorship to the longer liver, subject
to the payment of their debts, the education and marriage portion
of their children, and to the payment by her in the event she survived him, of certain legacies to his relations, amounting altogether to 80,000 florins, which contract was duly approved and
confirmed by the proper court of that country. Immediately
before his death, and with a view of enabling his wife to carry out
the contract just mentioned, Roth conveyed, or attempted to convey the property in controversy to her brother, Albert Staehle,
but whatever interest passed by it was subsequently re-conveyed by him to Amelia. After Roth's death, on the 25th of
September 1876, Madelaine visited Schorndorf, and while there
spent much of her time with Amelia, and accepted of her various
presents, etc. On the 26th of the same month Madelaine in
consideration of ten thousand marks, released to Amelia all claims
to and upon her late husband's estate, and on the 3d of October following, executed to her a deed to the property in controversy;
Roth at the time of his death left no child oi children, or descendants thereof. Under these circumstances, in 1878, the present
bill was filed by Madelaine in the Superior Court of Cook county
against Amelia and the heirs at law of Roth, in and by which she
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claims that the marriage between her and Roth was a legal and
valid marriage; that the decree of the Wurtemberg court and all
the proceedings upon which it is based were and are null and void,
and that she is, therefore, the lawful widow and heir of her said
husband, and as such entitled to a partition and division of his
estate under the statute. Amelia answered the bill, and also filed
a cross-bill setting up the facts above recited, and relying on them
to establish her rights as the survivor and lawful widow of Roth,
to the property in dispute. A. cross-bill was also filed by the heirs
of Roth, setting up their rights in the premises. The court found
the equities with Amelia upon her cross-bill, and entered a decree
dismissing the original bill, and directing the heirs of Roth to be
paid the amount due them under the "marriage and inheritance
contract." The decree was performed as to the heirs of Roth, and,
Madelaine Roth alone brought the case by appeal to this court for
review.
Hfarris, for appellant.
Rosenthal & Pence, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MULKEY, J.--In the view we take of this case, we do not deem

it necessary to follow counsel in the wide range their exhaustive
and elaborate arguments have taken ; but shall confine ourselves
to one or two of the topics discussed in the briefs, which we regard
as conclusive of the controversy, whatever may be, our views with
respect to the other issues in the case.
So far as the marriage between him and Madelaine Moser is
concerned, we have no hesitancy in saying that for all purposes in
this State, it was a legal and valid marriage, notwithstanding Roth,
at the time, was a subject of the Kingdom of Wurtemberg, and had
not obtained a license authorizing such marriage, from the sovereign of that kingdom, as required by the laws thereof. As both
of the parties were domiciled here at the time of its celebration,
it is not important to determine whether the validity of a marriage
depends upon the lex domicilii or the lex loci contractus; for whatever the conclusion which might be reached upon that 'question,
the result would be the same so far as this case is concerned, both
laws being identical; if the marriage was in conformity with either,.
it must necessarily have been with the other also, and as it seems
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to have been solemnized in strict conformity with our statute
regulating the subject, and as the parties were manifestly competent
under our own laws to contract the relation, it follows, as before
stated, the marriage was valid and binding.
While this marriage was clearly valid here for all purposes whatsoever, it does not follow that upon the return of the parties to the
country of their nativity, and of which'they were still subjects, it
would or ought to be held equally valid there; for it is clearly settled by the decided weight of private international law, so called,
that every State has the power to enact laws which will personally
bind its citizens or subjects when sojourning in a foreign jurisdiction, provided such laws in terms profess to so bind them when thus
circumstanced. It is true such laws have no extra-territorial effect
so as to authorize their enforcement in a foreign country, and may
therefore, so far as their execution is concerned, be said to remain
dormant till the return of those violating them, when they will be
enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as if their
infraction bad occurred within the State enacting them.
Nor does it follow that the status or relation created by the marriage could only be annulled by our own courts, or that it could only
be annulled by other courts fog such causes as would be recognised
as sufficient for that purpose under our own laws. When the parties returned to Wurtemberg and acquired a new domicile there,
so far as their personal rights and relations are concerned, our laws
and government ceased to have any power over them, or concern
with them. Personally the State had no claims on them and they
owed it no allegiance or duty.
Whether the Kingdom of Wurtemberg on their return and
acquiring a new domicile there, would recognise the status or relation which they had contracted here, depended upon its own laws,
and not upon ours. That kingdom, in 1808, adopted an ordinance
or law which was in full force at the time of the marriage in Chicago, declaring all such marriages in a foreign state, without the
license of the sovereign, absolutely null and void. It was, therefore, according to the general current of authority on the subject,
entirely competent for the courts of that kingdom having jurisdiction of such matters, to give effect to that law by annulling and
setting aside the marriage upon a proper application for that purpose, which was done in this case.
Ordinarily where a party upon a change of domicile goes into

ROTH v. EHAIN

another state 'or country, the personal status ihich he carries with
.him will be recognised by the courts of the latter country.
•This is certainly the general rule, but' it is subject to certain
well-recognised exceptions. If, for instance, Such status has been
acquired, as in the present case, by a violation of express provisions
of the positive law of the state in which its recognition is asked,
or if it be contrary to the genius and spirit of its institutions, as
a title of nobility would be here, or if it is opposed to its settled
policy, or to the good order and well-being of society, or to public
morality and decency, in all such cases the status would not and
should not be recognised by the courts of the latter state. Assuming the compromises of appellant with Amelia and Roth
respectively, relating to hef interest in the latter's estate, were
made by her in ignorance of her rights, and that they were
effected through the fraud and misrepresentation of them and others
acting in concert with them, as is claimed by her, of which we
express no opinion, at least for the present, it follows that the result
of this case must depend chiefly upon the legal effect which must, under the circumstances stated, be given by the courts of this state to
the decree rendered by the Wurtemberg court annulling the marriage, and this we regard as the vital question in the case. The
general rule unquestionably is, where it affirmatively appears that
the court of a foreign state has jurisdiction of the parties and
subject-matter of the suit,, its judgment or decree w'll be conclusive on the parties, their legal representatives and privies, in all.
countries where the matters litigated are again drawn in question,
and this is particularly true with respect to judgments or decrees
affecting the status of a person; for they are in the nature of
judgments in rem, which are binding on the whole world. Wharton's Conflict of Laws, sections 800-2, 815-17, 822-23; Bigelow on Estoppel 170-178; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 528.
The above rule is also fully recognijsed by this court. Baker v.
Palmer, 83 Ill. 568. The limitation to this rule is that it may be
shown that such judgment, or decree was obtained by means of
fraud or some gross abuse of the process of the court or flagrant
departure from the ordinary course of judicial procedure, as for
instance, that a party in interest sat as a judge in the cause.
While it is claimed by counsel for appellant, in general terms,
that the court rendering the decree in question acted without jurisdiction, and that the same was obtained by fraud, yet we fail to
VOL. -XX.-75
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discover anything in the record to warrant either of these
charges.
It is not sufficient, as it has often been held by this court, for
the purpose of successfully assailing a transaction on the ground
of fraud, to charge fraud generally; but the complaining party
must state in his pleading and prove on the trial, specific acts or
'facts relied on as establishing fraud. That has not been done in
this case; so far as we are able to discover, the trial was perfectly_
regular, and conducted with the utmost fairness, and we see no
ground to -question the jurisdiction of the court. The depositions
of persons learned in the law of that country have been taken in
this case, and they clearly show the several courts through which
that case passed during its pendency, were by the laws of that
country the proper tribunals to take cognisance of cases of that character in the manner it was done; and it is further shown That
both parties appeared in the cause by themselves and counsel;
hence, as before stated, we see no ground for- questioning the
jurisdiction of those tribunals.
We are of opinion, therefore, the decree of nullity must be given
in the courts hare the same effect which would be given to it
by the courts of the country in which it was rendered. The effect
of the decree there, as we understand it, was not merely to establish
conclusively the nullity of the contract of marriage, or of the
marriage itself, but also to annul and terminate the status or marital
relations of the parties, which arises from a de facto as well as a
de jure marriage, so as to leave them in precisely the same condition as if no marriage had ever taken place between them. This
being the effect of the decree there, it must be given the same
effect here.
Such, then, being the legal operation of, the decree, it follows
that the appellant was not at the time of Roth's death his wife,
either de facto or de jure, and hence she is not his widow, for no
one answers that description who was not his wife at the time of
his death, and consequently she has no right, as such, to succeed
to his estate.
For the same reasons it follows that the subsequent marriage
between Roth and Amelia was lawful and valid, and that relation
having continued up to the time of his death, it results that "she,
and not appellant, is his lawful widow, and as such is entitled to
his estate.
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It is true the " marriage and inheritance contract" did not, upon
his decease, have the effect of clothing her with the legal title to
the real estate in controversy as his survivor, as it doubtless would
have done had the property been situated in the Kingdom of Wurtemberg, instead of here ; for it is not competent for parties here
or elsewhere by mere agreement to charge the manner of transferring real property in this state, but the agreement in question
upon his decease operated as an equitable assignment of the estate
to her, which was properly enforced by the decree in this cause.
Hlaving reached the conclusion stated with respect to the decree
of nullity, it is therefore unnecessary to discuss the effect of the
compromises above alluded t6 and relied upon as an estoppel by
appellee. Whatever our views might be with respect to that matter, we are of opinion the law is with the appellee on the grounds
already stated.
Decree affirmed.
SCOTT

and

WALKER,

JJ., dissented.

Many of the governments of Europe
impose restraints and prohibitions upon
the marriage of their subjects abroad.
France, Belgium, the Provinces on the
left bank of the Rhine, the Duchy of
Burg, the Netherlands, the Grand Duchy
of Baden and the two Sicilies require the
marriage of their subjects abroad to be
publicly contracted, and that the man be
twenty-five, and the woman twenty-one
years of age. Bavaria and Wurtemherg
forbid the marriage of their subjects
abroad without the consent oftheir respective governments. Baden and Switzerland forbid the intermarriage of their citizens without such governmental consent.
The same is true of Bavaria and Austria.
The latter country, and likewise Saxony,
impose upon their subjects the same
restrictions as to the marriage of their
subjects abroad as France imposes upon
French subjects abroad. Prussia nullifies the marriage of its citizens abroad
with intent to evade the Prussian laws.
Denmark, Norway, Schleswig and Holstein make such marriages voidable.
Nassau prohibits its subjects from marrying Jews abroad without the consent

of the home government. Sardinia requires its subjects marrying abroad to
do so according to the rites of the Roman
Church. England prohibits absolutely
the marriage abroad of an Englishman
with his deceased wife's sister, and'
makes the consent of Parliament a prerequisite to the marriage abroad of a
member of the royal family. The penalty
generally attached to these prohibitions
is that the marriage will be null and
void, or voidable, even though valid in
the place where contracted. Various
reasons are relied upon to sustain
these enactments-among others, that
governmental consent is required in order
to prevent male subjects from marrying
before they perform the military duty
they owe the state; and also as a police
regulation to restrain or prevent marriage until the contracting parties shall
be able to take care of a family.
Every nation may control the status
of its citizens, and enforce such control
whenever persons or property within its
jurisdiction enable it to do so: Westlake
Priv. Int. Law 24-80; Story's Conf.
Law, sects. 223, 224, 228-30 ; Whart.
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Conf. Law, 2d ed., sects. 132, 205, 211,
219, 223; 1 Bish. M. & D., sects. 367,
369 ; Guthrie's Savigny Priv. Int. Law
248; 2 Kent :107, note; Hubback on
Suec. 335 ; Bigelow on Estoppel 159,
160; PiggottFor. Judg. 167, 168; Saw
v. Gould, L. R., 3 H. L. 56, per Lord
WESTBURY; Ifmmier v. Kiinnier, 45 N.
Y. 535; Hunt y.Hunt, 72 Id. 228; Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260; Cheever v.
Wilson, 9 Wall. 108; Straderv. Graham,
10 How. 82; Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts
349; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. 1. 87;
Udn!q v. Udny, L. R., I S. Ch. App.
441; Potter v. Brown, 5 Eist 124;
ilfette v. .lette, I Sw. & Tr. 416; Dicey
221 ; Forbes v. Cochrane, 2 B. & C. 448.
Marriage is a status and every state
has the right to formulate and to enforce,
as td persons within its jurisdiction, its
own marital policy. It may declare Who
of its subjects may marry, under what
conditions and with what ceremonies;
and it may make its enactments with
reference to these.matters ubiquitousthat is, obligatory upon its subjects
wherever they go. Their duty to obey
follows from their duty of allegiance,
but obedience can be compelled only by
the action of the state either upon pro"ptrty which its subjects left in its jurisdiction upon going abroad, or upon their
persons when they return: I Bish. I. &
D., sects. 3, 667 ; Storys Conf. Laws,
sects. 228, 229 a, 229b, 20a; Barber
v. Root, 10 Mass. 265 ; Strader v. Graham, 10 How. 82 ; Maguire v. M1aquire,
7 Dana 181 ; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall.
108 ; Harrisonv.Harrison, 19 Ala. 499 ;
RTarvie v. Farnie, L. R., 5 P. D. 153;
43 L. T. R. 738 ; L..R., 6 P. D. 35 ;
23 'Alb.L. J. 329. But no state can
reach the persons or property of its subjects abroad, except under some treaty
or international contract. No state can,
while its subject is abroad, compel him
to conform to its marital policy. No
government can formulate and enforce
its own policy in the country of another
government, even as to its own citizens

sojourning there. Take for example the
rule that no man shall marry his sisterin-law. This is a part of British marital
policy. But the statute fbrmulating the
rule is not in force even in Canda:
Hodgins v. McNeil, 9 Grant's Ch. (Up.
Can.) 309; 9 U. C. L. J. 126. In
Stevenson v. Gray, 17 B. Monroe 208,
MARSHALL, C. J., says : "By a statute
of Virginia, the marriage of a man with
his deceased wife's sister was declared
or deemed to be unlawful, but such a
marriage taking place in another state,
where it was lawful, would surely not
be affected by the penalties or other consequences denounced by tbis.statutc if
the parties should subsequently remove
In Dannelli
to the state of Virginia."
v. Dannelli, 4 Bush 55, a marriage of
two Italians so related, contracted in and
valid by the laws of Switzerland, was
held valid although contrary to the laws
of Italy; and Mr. Bishop says (I M. &
D., sect. 320) : "Mlarriage with the deceased wife's sister is, in most of the
states, not only not forbidden, but
deemed commendable."
Prohibitions by other countries upon
their subjects marrying until they have
attained certain ages, are not enforced
by American courts: Whart. Conf.
Laws, sect. 147.
Laws making the precedent consent
of parents or of the state essential to a
valid marriage, are not of extra territorial obligation : Whart. Conf. Laws,
sect. 150.
Neither are laws prohibiting the marriage of ecclesiastics: Whart. Conf.
Laws, sect. 154. Nor are prohibitions
of marriage with Jews or infidels :
Wbart. Conf. Laws, sect. 155. Nor
ave laws prohibiting marriage on account of inequality of rank: Whart.
Conf. Laws, sect. 158. Nor are laws pro
hibiting miscegenetic marriages: Whart.
Cofif. Laws, sect. 159.
. All these statutory prohibitions are in
force in te countries that enact them.
But they are not of extra territorial
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obligation. They can restrain or compel
no one in the various United States.
American courts do not recognise or
enforce them, because they are part of
the marital policy of other countries,
and are in derogation of a well-established principle of American policy.
Early marriages lessen prostitution
and illegitimacy. They hasten the establishment of new homes. They accellerate the occupancy and development
of a new and sparsely-settled country.
They.are promotive of industry, frugality
and temperance. They add to the native
born population, and for these reasons,
it is the policy of the United States to
encourage early, easy and lawful marriage. Inducements to marriage, in the
shape of homesteads and exemptions in
favor of families, are held out by the
states, and the restraints and prohibitions noticed above have never been imposed. Nor are foreign restraints of
this nature recognised. True, such forcign prohibitions are said to be ubiquitous; but this means- only that they
follow the subject to the new country,
not as being enforceable against him
there, but only as enforceable upon
his return to his native country, or only
so far as they can be enforced against
him in the new country through property.
left by him in the old.
Nor can the local laws of foreign
nations that are in derogation of principles of American policy be enforced in
the United States when they are put in
the shape of a judgment. The question
arose in DcBrimont v. Penniman, 10
Blatchf. 436. DeBrimont, a French
citizen, married, in France, the daughter
of James and Cornelia Penniman, citizens of the United States. Subsequently
Mrs. DeBrimonr died, leaving a child
of such marriage. Under the statute
law of France, providing that a fatherin-law and a mother-in-law must make
an allowance to a son-in-law who is in
need, so long as a child of the marriage
is living, DeBrimont afterwards ob-

tained, in a court of France, a judgment
or decree against James and Cornelia
Peuniman, then residing in France, in
an action in which they' were served
with process and appeared, requiring
them to pay to him a certain sum per
year, in monthly payments, in advance,
one-third of it to be for his use, and twothirds of it for the use of the child.
DeBrimont brought an action of debt,
on this judgment or decree, in the United
States Circuit Court, against the Pennimans, to recover the amount of the
decreed payment for two years and
seven months. It was decided that the
suit could not be maintained, and that
the laws of France upon which such
decree was made, and the decree founded
thereon, were local in their nature and
operation. That they were- designed to
reguIate the domestic relations of those
who reside there, and to protect the public against pauperism. That they had
no extra-territorial significance, and that
they were to be executed upon persons
and property within their jurisdictioii.
The result of all this is that the law
of Wurtemberg making the precedent
consent of the king of that country
essential to enable one of his subjects to
marry abroad, is not and never was in
force in Illinois or in any other American
state. It is in derogation of American
marital policy.
or will any foreign
judgment, amounting in fact merely to
an expression of that law, be enforced
to the extent of making the consent of
the Wurtemburg government essential
to the validity of an American marriage,
or to the extent of declaring such a marriage null and void for want of such
consent.
The case of Simonin v. ilfallac, 29
Law Jour. (Prob. & Af.) 97, bears directly upon this point. Valerie Simonin
and Leon Mallac came from France to
England to get married, in order to
avoid the necessity of publication and
parental consent. They were married
in England, and afterwards the Frenclh
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courts declared the marriage void.
Later, Valerie removed to England
and applied to an English court for a
confirmatory *decree of nullity, which
was, however, refused, the court holding
the marriage valid and declining to give
any effect to the decree of nullity by the
French court.
Said the English court: "Which
would'he for the common benefit and
advantage in such cases as the present,
the observance of the law of the country
where the marriage is celebrated, or of a
foreign country ? Parties contracting in
any country are to be assumeu to know,
or take the responsibility of not knowing,
the law of that country. Now, the law
of France is equally stringent whether
both parties are French, or one only.
Assume, then, that a French subject
comes to England, -and there marries
without cbnsent a subject of another
foreign country, by the laws of which
such marriage would be valid, which
law is to prevail ? To which country is
an English tribunal to pay the compliment of adopting its law ? As far as
the law of nations is concerned each
must have an equal right to claim respect for its laws. Both cannot be observed. Would it not, then, be more
just, and, therefore, more for the interest of all, that the law of that country
should prevail which both are presumed
to know, and agree to be bound by ?
Again, assume that one of the parties is
English, would not an English subject
have as strong a claim to the benefit of
English law as a foreigner to the benefit
of foreign law ? But it may be said that
in the case now before the court, both
parties are French, and, therefore, no
such difficulty can arise. That is true ;
but if once the principle of surrendering
our own law to that of a foreign country
is recognised, it must be followed out to
all its consequences. The cases put are,
therefore, a fair test as to the possibility
of maintaining that by any comitas or
•jus gentium this court is bound to adopt
the law of France as its guide."

Counsel for appellees in the principal
case seeing the force of Sinonin v.M1allac
as authority against recognising the foreign decree of nullity, say that that case
"was whether the English courts would
recognise the invalidity of tise old status
of marriage which was valid according to
English law," and continuing, they say :
"The recognition of the first status, which
was the marriage, is entirely a different
question from the recognition of the second status created by the decree of nullity. * * * We are not asking this
court to say that the marriage in Illinois
was invalid. It was valid by our law.
* *
But we are asking this court to
recognise the new status created by the
decree of nullity in the court of their
domicile." To this may it not be
replied that, .if the decree of nullity is to
be recognised at all, it must be recognised and accepted with all its consequences? These consequences are not
merely the establishment for each party of
a new status of single blessedness. Other
and more important consequences result.
Unlike a decree of divorce, which admits the first marriage to have been valid,
the decree of nullity declares it to have
been no marriage at all.Children born
of the cohabitation are bastardized and
deprived of their legitimate rights of
inheritance. Botis man and woman are
divested of all right to each others property. If a foreign decree of nullity is
valid and enforceable as to one of its
consequences, e. g., the establishment of
a new status for each of the parties to it,
is it not equally valid and enforceable as
to any other consequence resulting from
it, for example, to effect the illegitimatdon of children ? If it he accepted
with one of its legal consequences, must
it not be taken with the others also?
Would it be valid for the purpose of defining the status of husband and wife,
but invalid f6r the purpose of defining
the status of their children ?
It is true that there is apparently some
authority for saying there is no difference between a decree of nullity and a
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decree of divorce, when the question
comes up as to what effect is to be given
to a foreign decree of either kind. Mr.
Bishop (I Al. & D. sect. 354) says:
"I*am not aware that any difference of
principle between such a decree and one
of nullity was ever suggested, or that
there is any foundation of reason for distinguishing the two," but he admits that
"in the facts of most of the adjudged
cases, the decree has been for the dissolving of a valid marriage, i. e., a decree of divorce."
It is true, also, that
Wharton (Conf. Laws, 2d ed. sect. 213),
says : "The same general principles
apply to processes to declare marriages
null."
But the next sentence says:
"There must be domiciliary jurisdiction,
and the proceedings must be regular,"
which shows the author to have spoken
with reference, not to the effect in an
American state, of a foreign decree of
nullity, but merely to the procedure
necessary to render a decreeof nullity.
Story (Conf. Laws, sect. 595), says:
"As to sentences confirming marriages
or granting divorces, they may well
stand upon a distinct ground. If they
are pronounced by competent tribunals
in regard to persons within the jurisdiction; there is great reason to say that
they ought to be held of universal conclusiveness, force and effect in all
countries," and counsel argue from this
that there is no difference in principle
between confirminga marriage by decree,
or declaring it null by the same process;
that the one process necessarily involves
the other; and that if the decree be
binding when decided for the defendant
in a suit impeachi.g the validity of the
marriage, that is, if the decree confirms
the marriage, so must it be binding between the same parties, if the court
should find for the plaintiff instead of
the defendant, that is, if the court annuls
the marriage. To this it seems proper
to reply, first, that the decree in question
is one of nullity ; therefore, Judge
STonY's remark, so far as they concern

a decree of divorce have no application ;
second, an American court would recognise as valid a marriage legally contracted within its jurisdiction, because
to do otherwise would be to disregard
the laws of its own government, and
not because such marriage might happen
to have been "confirmed"
by some
foreign tribunal; and third, there is a
difference in consequence, if not in principle, between " confirming" and annulling a marriage. Confirmation of marriage does not dissolve marriage or illegitimize children, or take away property
rights ; but annulment does all this.
As to anything said in Roach v.
Garan, I Yes. Sen. 157 ; Barber v.
Root, 19 Mass. 265 : Cottington's Case,
2 Swanst. 326 n. ; and Harrey-. Farnie, Law Rep., 5 P. D. 153, to the
effect that a foreign decree dissolving a
marriage must be accepted .by all countries as binding, the reply is that whatever was there said related to foreign
decrees of divorce and not to foreign decrees of nullity.
Mr. Bishop's dictum, above quoted,
is the strongest authority in favor of
recognising as valid a foreign decree annulling a marriage. But his remarks do
not show that he had the consequences
of annulling a marriage fully in mind
when he wrote. It is not apparent that
his attention was especially called to the
effect which recognising such a foreign
decree would have either upon the legitimacy of children or upon the marital
policy of the government.
It does not appear, therefore, that the
authorities, excepting perhaps Mr. Bishop's dictum, show that a deree of nullity is as binding abroad a is a decree
of divorce.
It may be concluded, therefore, that,
as a decree of nullity, carrying all the
consequcncs of such a decree, including
the avoidance of the marriage ab initio
and the illegitimation of children born
of the union, such a judgment as that of
the Wurtembcrg court cannot be ac-
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cepted as valid in Illinois.

To do so

parties was never changed and con-

would be to engraft a new rule upon the tinues to exist notwithstanding their
marital policy of that state. It would
attempted but void marriage. In other
obligate immigrants to Illinois from words. the effect of a decree of nullity
.zountries where such consent is required
of marriage appears to be not to estab,
to be obtained, to apply for and secure,
lish any new status, but simply to declare
before they marry, the consent of the
that an old status continues to exist ungovernments whose jurisdiction they altered and unaffected by an attempted
have left. Such a law needs only to be but absolutely null and void marriage.
stated to be rejected as unsound.
How can a decree of nullity of marriage
And while it is clear that a for- be recognised as creating a new status
eign judgment of nullity cannot be where its effect is not to create any new
wholly accepted in America as validstatus, but only to declare the existence
that is, with all its consequences, in- and continuance of an old one ? Councluding those of illegitimation and ab sel and court say the marriage in Illinois
initio avoidance of marriage, its partial
was a valid marriage. How then can
acceptance-for example, its acceptance
they accept and enforce a foreign decree
to the same extent that a foreign decree
of nullity which says that the Illinois
of divorce is taken, i. e., as establishing a marriage was and is unlawful, invalid,
new status for the parties to it, is not binding and ab initio null and void ?
not free from difficulties arising out of
The reasoning and conclusion of the
its effect as a decree of nullity. As principal case may or may not be sound
Mr. Bishop says (2 M. & D., sect. law.
Further information, discussion
690): "The general doctrine is, that
and adjudication must settle this. But
the parties are then (after the decree of. the decision certainly appears very quesnullity) regarded as if no marriage had
tionable. One cannot but feel that it
taken place; they are single persons if
would rest upon foundations much more
before they were single," and he quotes
solid if grounded upon the American
Anstey v. M31anuers, Gow 10, that " If
wife's agreement to renounce all her
the wife becomes a siagle woman by rights to her husband's American prooperation of law, it is the same as if she perty.
had always remained single."
The
ADELBERT HAMILTON.
meaning of this is, that the status of the
Chicago.

Supreme Court of 1ilississippi.
WILLIAM OLIVER v. JOHN C. LOVE.
The assignee of a covenant for title to land situated in Louisiana may maintain
in Mississippi, a bill in equity to obtain reimbursement for expenditures made by
him in resisting'a suit and in extinguishing a paramount title asserted and maintained
as to the land.
Semble, such assignee might also have maintained a suit at law for money paid out
and expended for the use of*the covenanter.
Whether an action for damages for an injury to land situated out of the state may
not be maintained in the courts of Mississippi, qucere.
A court of equity is not like a court of law fettered by the rule as to local and
transitory actions,
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from Chancery Court of Copiah county.
The appellee exhibited his bill in said court to obtain reimbursement for expenditures made by him in resisting a suit and in
extinguishing a paramount title asserted and maintained- as to land
situated in Louisiana, which the appellant had sold and conveyed
with a warranty of title to one Smith, who assigned to the appellee.
The bill was demurred to, because the land is in Louisiana, and
the right of the complainant sprung not from contract but from
privity of estate by reason of the covenant of warranty of title
which ran with the land, and therefore the courts of this state
can not give relief, because, it is said, and conceded on both sides,
that an action founded in privity of estate is by the common law
local and not transitory, and is not maintainable out of the jurisdiction in which it arose. The court below overruled the demurrer,
whereupon respondent appealed.
APPEAL

The opinion of the court was delivered by
is the settled doctrine in England and AmerCAMPBELL, J.-It
ica at common law that no local action can be maintained out of
the jurisdiction in which it arose, and although this is, in many
instances, to deprive a party of all remedy, the rule is said to be
peremptory and inflexible. Accordingly, it has been repeatedly
held, that trespass for injuries to land in one country or state can
not be maintained in another, and that'no recovery can be had on
a covenant running with land by an assignee of the covenantee,
except in the state where the land lies, even when the covenantor
resides elsewhere: Doulson v. MJIatth1ews, 4 Term 503: Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203; Watts v. Kinney, 23 Wend. 484;
s. c. 6 Hill 82; Eachus v. illinois &' Iich. -ailroad Co., 17 Ill.
534; Worster v. The Winnep. Lake Co., 5 Foster 525; Lienow v.
BEllis, 6 Mass. 331; Clark v. Scudder, 6 Gray 122; University
of Vermont v. Joslyn, 21 Vermont 52; White v. Sanborn, 6 N.
I. 220.
If this case is governed by the common law, the suit is not
maintainable. All of the cases cited above rest upon the common
law, and the distinction it made between local and transitory
actions.
Originally, all actions were local, and great regard was had to
place, so that every material allegation of a pleading had to be
accompanied by the averment of a place, in order that a jury
VoL- XXX.-76
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might be summoned from the proper neighborhood, if issue should
be taken on any of such allegations. The courts, in order to relieve
against the difficulties which arose from the necessity of the proper
venue in .every action, took a distinction between matters which
were local and those which were transitory, and invented a fiction
whereby actions for causes of a transitory character, wherever they
arose, might be maintained without regard to locality, "while no
cognisance could be taken of local actions save where a jury of
the county could be summoned to try them." A result was that
for an injury to the person or chattels, and for a breach of any
,contract, even if it related to land a remedy might be had in the
courts of another state or country than that in which the injury
was done or in which the land lay.. In other words, if the action
was transitory and not local, it was maintainable anywhere.
The courts in England soon freed themselves from the fetters
of locality, as to all causes of action of such nature that they
might arise anywhere, and by means of falsehood, politely called
fiction, and stated under a videlicet, which was an apology for not
telling .the truth, maintained actions on such'causes of action as
arose out of the territorial jurisdiction of the courts of England.
But such causes of action as could from their nature arise only in
one place, and therefore were considered as local, and to be
redressed only by local actions, did not arise with the frequency of
the other class, and did not press upon the courts sufficiently to
induce them to include them in the fiction invented to sustain the
other class of actions, and as to them the courts continued bound
by the idea of the place at which they arose. Therefore it is that
courts governed by the common law as to actions and process have
felt bound to deny a remedy for causes of action arising abroad
which could be redressed only by local action. Tried even by this
rule an action might be maintained in the circuit court of Copiah
county, by the appellee against the appellant, for by our law it is
not local but transitory.' The only local actions under our statute
are ejectment and actions of trespass for injuries to land. They
must be brought in the county in which the land lies. All other
actions must be brought with reference to the person of the
defendant.
The common-law distinction of local and transitory actions does
not exist here. The statute alone governs, and we can not disregard it, and, because under the common law no remedy could be
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had by the assignee of a covenantee in a covenant of warranty of
title of land lying in another state, deny a remedy in the courts
of this state, which does not treat such an action as a local one.
The courts which have held such an action not maintainable have
done so under the stress of the common law, which they felt so
bound them as to constrain them to do what reason revolted at.
Happily, we are freed from the constraint of this absurd rule, and
look to our statutes to see what actions may be maintained by our
courts. The appellee might maintain an action for money paid to
the use of the appellant: Kirkpatrick v. .Ikiller. 50 Miss. 521;
-Dye-r v. Britton, 53 Id. 270.
In the last case cited Britton was an assignee of the covenantee,
and was held to be entitled to maintain assumpsit for money paid.
Certainly, that is not a local action, under the common law.
But apart from all this, which is conclusive of the case, this is
not an action.of law, but a suit in equity, which never was hampered by distinctions of local and transitory causes of action, as
were courts of law. All of our courts must exercise their jurisdiction in proper places, but except as prescribed by statutes, the
place which gave birth to a cause of action is of no influence in
determining the jurisdiction of a court.
There is no objection to maintaining a suit in the courts of one
state, because it arose out of a controversy about land in another
state, for it is admitted that a remedy will be afforded by the courts
of one state on a contract about land in another. And it is settled that an action by the covenantee for a breach of warranty of
title is not local, but is transitory, because it is said to arise from
contract, and, being transitory, it would follow that it might be
maintained anywhere unaffected by the locality of the land.
In England the actions made transitory by the statute (32 Henry
VIII. c. 34), were held to be freed from the feature of locality
before affecting them. In Massachusetts a statute was held to
have wrought a change in the character of an action otherwise a
local one, and to authorize it to be brought elsewhere; Summer v.
Finegan, 15 Mass. 280; Pitman v. Flint, 10 Pick. 504. This
is the doctrine in Ohio: .Genin v. Grier.,10 Ohio 209. See also,
Miller v. Thurmond, 20 Mo. 477; Graves v. McJKeon, 2 Denio
639.
We are by no means prepared to say that an action tor damages
for an injury to land situated out of this state may not be main-
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tained in the courts of this state. This question is not now presented for decision, and is, adverted to, lest we may be considered
as committed to the doctrine that, because such an action arising
in this state must be instituted in the county in which the land lies,
therefore where the land lies out of the state, and the statute cannot be complied with, no action can be maintained. It may be
that the statute regulating the venue of actions relates only to such
local actions as arise in this state, and that all causes of action
arising abroad, not involving recovery of possession of land, are
maintainable by the court of that county where the defendant may
be found.
We leave this an open question.
Decree aflfirmed.
The statement of facts in the principal
case does not disclose whether it is one
maintainable in a court of equity by
reason of its jurisdiction to decree specific performance, refornation or rescission or an injunction, with powers
extended to decree damages by legislation similar fo "Lord Cairns's Act,"
21 & 22 Vict., c. 27, or whether the
jurisdiction was acquired by state statutes enlarging the jurisdiction of courts
of equity. Without such legislation it
might not be maintained, irrespective of
any question of the differences between
local and transitory actions, as there
would be an adequate remedy at law for
the damages sued for, and it is probable
a demurrer for that cadise would have
been sustained: Rawle Coy. (4th cd.)
648; 2 Danl. Ch. Pr. (5th ed.) 1081.
The statutory modification of the common-law distinctions between local and
transitory actions referred to in the
principal case will probably be found
in most if not all the states having codes
ofpractice. These generally direct when,
how and where actions may be brought,
with almost sole reference to the residence or place where the defendant is
found; and in directing what actions
shall be brought in the county where the
land lay they confine the restriction, as
in the Mississippi statute, to ejectment

and trespasses on the land. But now and
then we come across some old commonlaw draughtsman whose-statute requires
"suits of a local nature" to be brought
within defined territorial limits : U. S.
Rev. Stat., sects. 740, 741, 742, 744.
The denial of all remedy in such cases,
that sometimes results where the defendant cannot be found in the particular
district to which the plaintiff is confined,
is obviated by these federal statutes, if
he resides in the same state, by sending
the writ to that district in which he does
reside. Otherwise these statutes would
seem to impose all the old-fashioned
"fetters of locality," as Mr. Justice
CA' IPBBLL calls them, unless we are to
interpret the phrase "suits of a local
nature" according to the law of the
state in which the. suit is bronght, and
not according to the common law. It
might be interesting to note whether the
principal case could have received the
same intelligent judgment if it had been
brought in a federal court or removed
thereto-aside from the manifest difficulty of any jurisdiction of a federal
court of equity over it--which had its
jurisdiction so restricted ; and if not,
would we not have the common-law predicament, under som6 circumstances, of
leaving the plaintiff practically without
remedy ? These questions are more easily
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asked than answered by any adjudica- 740, 744, be repealed by the Act of
tions to be found affording a solution.
1875, there is no longer any provision
And the opinion suggests with silent for suits of " a local nature," such as is
force the perplexities that lie within found in those sections. It will be obthese words, "suits of a local nature,"
served, also, that some of these statutes
remarkably dormant though they be, for pertain to suits in their relation to sepathe reason, perhaps, that except in eject- rate districts in the same state or to
ment where we get along without any divisions of the same district, while
defendant but the actual occupier, this none of them in terms provide for the
'distinctions of tie subject arising out of
class of suits is rare in all courts.
Again, whether these sections of the the location of the land in another state,
revised statutes are at all affected by the as in the principal case, though it would
Act of March 3d 1875, 18 Stat. 470, as seem an implication from ihe act o,
is intimated by the compiler of the sup- 1858 that "suits of a local nature"
plement-Rev. Stat., I Supl. 173could not be brought out of the state
may be questionable. But if they are where the land lay, although the defendmodified or repealed by that act the per- ant may be found in another district,
plexities above mentioned are increased,
and in transitory actions suable there.
for the want of uniformity in the legisla- If these statutes may be confined in
tion of Congress on tile subject and its their legislative command so that they
defective character, if they be repealed, are to be treated as mere regulations of
becomes apparent on comparison of procedure-and not jurisdictional in a
the repealed sections with the special technical sense-to govern the inter-disacts establishing new districts or pre- trict practice in the same state, the differscribing additional places for holding ence between local and transitory actions
the courts. In some of them this phrase- is left by congressional legislation in its
ology in reference to " suits of a local inter-state application, to the influence
nature" is kept up without the fall pro- of the common law, unless indeed the
visions on the subject contained in the broad language of all the judiciary acts
old Act of 1858 carried into the revised giving jurisdiction in "ali civil suits,"
statutes at the sections above cited, and and providing that "no civil suit shall
tile repeal of which is intimated : Rev. be brought against an inhabitant of the
Stat., I Sjipl. 508, ch. 17, sect.' 4; Id. United States, by any original process
509, ch. 18, sect. 4; Id. 536, ch. 120, in any other district than that of which
sect. 2 ; Id. 548, ch. 203, sect. 5; Id. he is an inhabitant, or in which he is
384, ch. 359, sect. 1, par. 17 ; Id. 415, found at the time of serving the writ,"
ch. 97; Id. 262, ch. 41; Id. 407, ch. may be held to havp abolished these dis43; Id. 376, eh. 326, sect. 2. Some tinctions altogether: U. S. Rev. Stat.,
of these statutes provide for suits "not
sects. 629, 739 ; Rev. Stat., I Supl.
of a local nature," but make no pro- 173, ch. 1.37. Except, of course, in
vision for those that are of "a local that very limited class of cases where
nature," while others are entirely silent timeinternational obstacle to enforcing a
on the subject; that in reference to judgment for the delivery of possession
Michigan, however, says, ", The said of lands in a foreign jurisdiction exists.
circuit and district courts may regulate And here it may be worthy of remark
by general rule the venue of transitory that sometimes there is a manifest inactions, either in law or equity, and attention to this feature of the subject.
may change the same for cause," which Deferentially, it may be suggested that
is an anomalous arrangement. If, there- those cases and authors that find tbe
fore, the Act of 1858, Rev. Stat., sects. governing principle which refuses juris-
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diction over actions pertaining to land

foreign state affords no remedy the corn-

in a foreign state grounded in the cornmon-law distinctions as to venue between
local and transitory actions in the kingdomn of England confuse our ideas and
mislead us. It may be a bold thing to
say that this is an absolute error, and
that the two principles are as distinct as
two things can be, for if an error at all
it is vcncrable with age and sanctioned by
the highest authority ; but hoary as it is,
its absolute correbtness has been and
may again be challenged. The reason
why a court in England cannot entertain jurisdiction of an action of ejectment' for lands in France is not because
the jury should be summoned from the
vicinage and have a knowledge of the
witnesses, but because there is no power
to enforce the judgment and. no sort of
governmental authority over the land.
The owner being within the kingdom
of England, does not, under the principles of international law, confer the
jurisdiction to do that thing. So, where
the object of the suit is to effect a transmission of the ownership or title, France
will not, and internationEl law does not
require her to recognise any operation of
the laws of England to transmit the title ;
nor need she, if the English courts happen to have the owner within their grasp
and compel him by a notarial act or deed
strictly according to the law of France
to convey the title," rccognise a transfer
so coerced. She may or may not at her
pleasure give effect to such transfers,
Obviously actions like that of the principal case, or quare clausum fregit, do
not come within the operation of this'
principle, and there is nothing in it to
forbid the English courts from awarding
damages and satisfying them out of any
property in England. The courts may
decline the jurisdiction for any unsatisfactory reason like that of the venue in
local actions, and it seems they do where
the common law prevails, but that it is
not an inherent want of jurisdiction is
shown, by the fact that if the law of the

mon-law courts will not decline one.
They must decline or render abortive
judgments Where the case falls within
the international principle above mentioned, and they have no choice about it,
but the operation of that principle is
exceedingly limited, and does not depend on any of the vau6 if not inconse-,
quential differences between local and
transitory actions as laid down in the
books, but on a want of authority to en-force the judgment that is demanded in
the particular case. Even in a court of
equity acting in Personain to compel the
transfer of the title according to the law
of the place where the land is situated,
the judgment would be abortive if the
foreign law should refuse to recognise a
title so obtained, and hence the court"
will not entertain jurisdiction for that
purpose alone, and only acts on the title
incidentally, when it has jurisdiction for"
some other well-recognised purpose which.
will be sustained, and to this extent a
court of equity is controlled by the law
of local and transitory actions : Massie
Y. TWatts, 6 Cr. 148 ; Muller v. Dows,
94 U. S.444.
.Returning for the moment to the federal statutes, it is apparent that they
present a phase of the subject that it
would be interesting to consider iore at
length than the space allotted to-a note
permits. In suits at law there seems to
be some escape from the difficulties thby
present when read in the light of the
erudition of the principal case by defining'
the words "suits. of a local nature,"
according to the state laws as in other
matters of practice, and not according to
the common law. For example, there in
no reason in this day and generation why'
an action of trespass, quare clausumfrqzt,
which is local at common law, should
not be brought in any state where the
defendant is found, and under a common
count for money had and received in the
same way the principal case indicates the
action there might have been sustained
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under a count for money paid out and
expended. These reforms belong to the
legislatures and not the courts. But
Congress might, through its owi committees or commissions capable of instituting the reforms, bring the laws up to
the standard of the best modern improvements, and establish a code that would
regulate uniformly the practice of its
courts in the exercise of the judicial
power they possess. At least it could
define what it means by "suits of a
local nature," and not leave the courts
to grope in the dark places Mr. Justice
CA3r-BLL throws light upon.

Specific

definitions in statutes like these are better than generalizations, for reasons that
are plain in that light, and more particularly since they are made for a jurisprudence tbat has no common law of its
own, and constantly refers us to differential systems of state laws that often
furnishi'no guide where the acts of Congress are silent. The probability is,
that if the suit Air. Justice CAMPELL
was deciding had been brought in the
federal court of equity it would have
been dismissed; and if brought at law,
unaided by the Mississippi statute, it
would have been dismissed, and yet,
the acts of Congress forbid its being
brought in any other state than where
the defendant resides or is found. And
if tie laws of Louisiana treat it as a
transitory action, as they probably do,
although "a suit of a local nature,"
there could be no remedy there as long
as the defendant should remain out of
that state.
This note will be closed with a mere
reference to authorities that may be
useful to the reader in his investigations,
as the space assigned prevents any
more extended examination of them:
JfcKenna v. Fisk, 1 How. 241 ; Mitcl_
ell v. Harmony, 13 Id. 115 ; s. d. I
Blatch. 549; WTratts v. Waddle, 6 Peters
389; s. c. I McL. 200; Boyce v.

Grundy, 9 Peters 275; Northern, 4-c.,
Railroad v. 3ichigan, &c., Railroad, 15

How. 233 ; s. c. 5 MeL. 44.4; Miss. 6Mo. Railroad v. Ward, 2 Black 485
2"c.ficken v. Webdlb, I I Peters 25
Cherokee JN ation v. Georgia, 5 Id. 179
Brine V. Ins. Co., 96 U. S. 627, 635
Casey v. Adams, 102 Id. 66; Dennick
v. Railroad Co., 103 Id. II; Rundle v.
Delaware, 4;c., Canal Co., 1 Wall. Jr.
275, 282, and note; s. c. 14 How. 80
Gorman v. 21arsteller, 2 Cr. C. C. 311
Carrin ton v. Brents, I McL. 167;
lfesterwelt v. Lewis, 2 Id. 511 ; Tardy
v. Morgan, 3 Id. 358 ; Piequt v. Swan,
5 Mason 35, 42 ; Briggs v. French, I
Sumner 504 ; Lyman v. Lyiman, 2 Paine
11, 46; Vore v. Fowler, 2 Bond 294;
Cage v. Jeffiies, I Hempst. 409;
United States v. Ames 1 Wood. & Min:
76 ; Stillman v. White Rock, 6-c., Co.,
3 Id. 538 ; bot v. Edwards, 3 Blatch.
310 ; ianawha Coal Co. v. Kanawha
Coal Co., 7 Id. 391 ; Vheeler v. 1ifeCormick, 8 Id. 267 ; Locomotive, 6-c., Co. v.
Erie Railroad, 10 Id. 292; Cunningham
v. Ralls, 1 Fed. Rep. 453 ; Rutz v. St.
Louis, 7 Id. 438; 1 Spence Eq. 684699 ; I Tidd's Pr. 363, 428, 601, 610;
1 Washb. Real Prop. 522; Gould's P1.
Ch. 3; Cooley on Torts 470; Whart.
Confl. Laws 290, 711 ; Bout. Die., Abb.
Die. tit. Venue, Local Actions, Transitory Action: I Wins. Saund. 247 and
note; 1 Chit. P1. 298; 1 Bac. Abr.
78; 10Id. 364; 2 Danl. Ch. Pr. 1112;
7 Jac. Fish. Dig. 9983; Rawle Coy.
234, 532, 533 ; Waterman Spec. Perf.
22, 48; Alb. Law Your. 47, 119, 219 ;
7 Cent. Law Jour. 1, 2; The 31oxhani,
1 P. D. 45, 107 ; Whittaker v. Forbes,
1 C. P. D. 51 ; McGregor v. Tophdm,
3 Hare 132 ; Buenos Ayres, 6-c., Railroad v. Northern, 6-c., Railroad,L. R. 2
Q, B. Div. 210; s. c. 16 Am. Law
Reg. 359 and note. The state cases are
far too numerous for citation.
I.
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Supreme Court of Brror8 of Connecticut.
GEORGE T. MEECH v. SIDNEY A. ENSIGN.
In the ordinary case of a purchase of an equity of redemption from a mortgagor,
with a provision in the deed that the grantee assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage
debt, no right of action on the promise accrues to the mortgagee.
To give the mortgagee a right of action the promise must have been intended for
his benefit; it is not enough that a benefit may accrue to him.
ACTIox by a mortgagee against the purchaser of the equity of
redemption to recover a balance due on the mortgage debt. The
facts were as follows:
The plaintiff held a mortgage on real estate. The defendant
purchased the equity of redemption, agreeing with the mortgagor
to pay the mortgage debt. Subsequently the mortgage was foreclosed, the property then being worth less than the mortgage debt,
leaving a balance unpaid. This action was brought to recover the
balance. The promise was not assigned to the plaintiffs but was
discharged by the mortgagor before the suit was brought. The
question of the defendant's liability was reserved for the advice of
this court.

. HI. Parkerand H. B. Culver, for the plaintiffs.
f. S. Barbour and C. Lounabury, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
-CARPENTER, J.--.The case differs from the other cases on this
subject that have heretofore been before this court. We now have
the naked question whether the owner of a debt secured by a
mortgage may maintain an action on the promise, made by the pur-.
chaser of the equity of redemption to the mortgagor, to pay the
debt, without an assignment of the right of action which that promise gives. As a rule actions on contracts can be brotugbt only by
him with whom the contract was made and from whom the considoration moved. The legal title is deemed to be in him alone and
otrangers to the contract cannot sue. The rule is a salutary one
and should not be departed from except for good reasons. There
are, however, some exceptions to it. Actions of assumpsit may be
maintained in some instances where there is no express contract
with the \plaintiff and where the consideration does not move from
him. If A. receives money from B. to be paid to C., C. may
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maintain an action against A. These cases, however, are exceptions only in appearance. They, in fact, recognise the general
rule and are really within it; for the action is not brought on the
express promise by A. to B., but on an implied promise by A. to
pay the money to 0.
Another class of exceptions is where the contract has for its
object a benefit to a third party and is made with that intent.
*Some early English cases in which promises were made to a.father,
or made for the benefit of a child or nephew, are instances of this
class.
There may also be cases in which a third party may have some
peculiar equity in the subject-matter of a contract which will enable
him to maintain a bill in equity to enforce it. Does this case fall
within any exception recognised by authority and supported by
principle?
Before alluding to decided cases let us examine the case with
some -care in the light of the circumstances, for the purpose of discovering just what the intention of the parties was and precisely
what the defendant promised to do ; for courts always in enforcing
contracts in nd to give effect to the intention of the parties ; and
when that intention is discovered in respect to a legal and valid
contract it is the inflexible and imperative law of the case. And
it is a necessary part of the rule itself that the courts will not so
construe and enforce a contract as to bring about a result not expressed in the contract and not intended by the parties
What was the transaction ? It was not a sale of a piece of land
for a fixed price, equal to the value of the land, so as to create a
debt for that sum, but was simply a sale of the equity of redemption. The distinction between the land, unincumbered, and the
equity of redemption, is obvious enough, and is an important one,
as on it depends in a great degree the rights and obligations of the
parties.
The defendant purchased the equity of redemption. The finding is that the mortgagor "conveyed to the defendant said real
estate subject to said mortgage." So that the only debt brought
into existence by the transaction was the price agreed to be paid
for the equity of redemption. The mere purchase raised no debt
to the mortgagee which the defendant was to discharge. By the
contract of assumption.he obligated himself to the mortgagor to
pay the mortgage. Whether that raised any personal obligation to
VOL.
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the mortgagee is the question in the case. If the probable intention of the parties is to govern, it is difficult to find any such liability
in the transaction. The mortgagee was not a party to it, no part of
the consideration moved from him and he was in no worse condition
because of it. He still had the security of the land and the personal responsibility of the mortgagor, and that is all he contracted
for or required. The parties contracted with reference to their own
interests, not his; to benefit themselves, not him. He had no legal
or equitable interest in the contract, and there is no room for the
presumption that it was intended for his benefit.
There was no agency, express or implied. The mortgagor would
doubtless be surprised at the suggestion, should it be made, that he
was acting as the agent of the mortgagee. There was no substitution or novation, for that requires three parties, and here were
only two; besides the original debtor was not discharged. It was
not the object of the parties to give the mortgagee additional security ; and to interpret it in that sense is to give it a force and a
meaning never contemplated by the parties, and is, in effect, making a contract for them. The only contract which they made was
simply this, the defendant agreed that he would pay the mortgagor's
debt. The promisee alone had the legal and equitable interest.
It follows that he alone can enforce it, unless he imparts that right
to others. That he may sue will not be disputed. If the mortgagee has that right by force of the contract then two persons
wholly independent of each other have an equal right. If either
may sue both may, and a suit by one will not abate or bar a suit
by the other; and a discharge by one for any cause short of a fulfilment will not discharge the contract. Thus the promisor may be
harassed with two suits at the same time on the same contract;
and if he would compromise with the promisee he must obtain the
consent of a stranger. If this is the law it is an anomaly, for
another instance of the kind is hardly to be found in the whole
range of jurisprudence. We are aware that there are decisions
from courts of the highest authority, and whose opinions are entitled to the highest respect, which hold that the creditor may sue on
such contracts; perhaps it is not too much to say that the prevailing current of authority in this country is in that direction; but
believing as we do that they are not founded in good reason or
sound policy we cannot accept them as law. The question is an
open one in this state, and principle rather than precedent not
founded in principle should determine it.
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We cannot undertake to examine in detail the cases alluded to;
we can only refer in a general way to the reasoning by which they
are supported. It is interesting to note the various grounds on
which they stand, some of which are not only weak in themselves,
but fail to strengthen the others. It is an argument of no little
weight against the correctness of decisions which seem to require
disconnected and inharmonious reasons to sustain them.
Some of the cases seem to proceed "upon the principle that if
one person makes a promise to another, for the benefit of a third
person, that third person may maintain an action on the promise ;"
and that without regard to the question whether the benefit to a
third person was the principal thing intended or was a mere incident: Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268; Burr v. Beers, 24 Id.
178; Thorp v. Keokukc Coal Co., 48 Id. 253; Davis v. Calloway,
30 Ind. 112.
In cases of this class the reasoning is not uniform. In some, it
is suggested that from the express promise to the promisee the law
implies a promise to the third person. In others the principle of
agency is invoked, .and the mortgagor in making the contract is
treated as the agent of the mortgagee. The difficulty with this
last position is that it is contrary to the facts.
In Urquhart v. Brayton, 12 R. I. 169, DURFEE, 0. J., holds
the defendant liable to a third person on the ground of a novation,
while POTTER, J., in the same case places the liability on the
ground of money had and received.
There seem to be several difficulties in treating it as a novation;
1st, it changes the nature of the contract; 2d, it requires a third
party and here are but two; and 3d, an essential element of a
novation is wanting, the discharge of the original debtor.
In other cases the transaction is treated as a sale of the land,
irrespective of the mortgage, and a retention by the purchaser of
a portion of the purchase-money to be paid to the mortgagee:
H7off's Appeal, 24 Penn. St. 200; Urquhartv. Brayton, supra;
Blyer v. .3fonholland, 2 Sandf. Oh. 478.
When the circumstances will warrant that view of the facts
there is no difficulty. In such cases the debtor actually places or
leaves the money in the hands of the promisor to be paid to the
creditor, and the action for money had and received may be maintained not on a promise to the debtor, but on an implied promise
to the creditor.
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Other cases, and this class includes a large number, resort to
the doctrine of suretyship; Blyer v. Konholland, supra; Curtis
v. Tyler, 9 iPaige 432; Kinq v. Whitely, 10 Id. 465; Bissell v.
Bugbee, 7 Reporter 550; Crowell v. Currie, 27 N. J. Eq. 152.
We agree that that ground would be tenable in equity, at least
if that was the real contract between the parties; that is, if the
parties really intended by the transaction to furnish additional
security to the creditor. If not, it seems to us difficult to support
the decisions upon that ground. In order to do so the court must
assume, without reason and contrary to the fact, that such was the
object and purpose of the contract. We have already endeavored
to show that it was not. Let us examine the subject a little further.
There is no express contract of suretyship. Whatever element of
suretyship there is results by operation of law from the position in
which the parties place themselves. The defendant agreed with
the debtor that he would pay the debt. As between themselves he
thereby became the principal debtor. The original debtor not
being discharged he was also liable to the creditor. If compelled
to pay he was a surety only in this, that he had a right to call on
the defendant to indemnify him. But all this did not affect the
creditor and he is not a party to it. What interest has he in the
transaction ? and in what consists his equity ? To make that relationship available to him it is necessary not only to bring him into
contract relations with the other parties, but also to reverse the
positions of the principal and surety and make the purchaser the
surety instead of the principal. Upon what principle can that be
done ? By what process of reasoning can it be vindicated ?
Again, there is no implication of suretyship as between the
creditor and the other parties, as no such implication is necessary
in order to give full effect to the intention of the parties.
We come now to a class of cases which constitute an important,
exception to the rule we are considering, that suits must be brought,
by the party making the contract and from whom the consideration
moved. We refer to those cases in which the parties confessedly
contracted for the benefit of third persons, not incidentally but as
the principal object. Some of the cases cited by the plaintiffs are
cases of this description and are not applicable to the case at bar.
There may be cases, however, in which this principle is invoked to
sustain actions by the mortgagee against the purchaser of the equity
of redemption.
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. The principle itself is best illustrated by a brief reference to a
few of the leading cases. In -Dutton v. Pool, 1 Ventris 318, the
defendant promised the father to pay the daughter a sum of
money as a marriage portion. It was held that the daughter
might sue on the promise. The relation of the father to the
daughter and his obligation to give her a marriage portion seem
to be adopted as a substitute for privity of contract. Some of
the decisions in the state of New York have taken a similar view,
and treat the obligation of the mortgagor to the mortgagee as a
"substitute for privity," or "privity by substitution," to connect
the mortgagee with the contract: T7room v. Turner, 69 N. Y.
280, and cases cited. -Dutton v. Pool, in modern times in this
country, would be upheld on the ground that the promise was
intended for the benefit of the daughter as its object. In Felton
v. Dickinson, 10 Mass. 287, the defendant promised the father of
a minor son to pay the son a sum of money for his services.
After performing the services it was held that the son might
maintain an action in his own name.
In Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432 (same case in error 9 Cow.
639), the defendant bought hay of the debtor, in consideration of
which he promised to pay the debt due the plaintiff. The plaintiff maintained a suit in his own name.
In Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143, the defendant promised
A. that if he would sign a bail-bond he would give him a bond of
indemnity. A. and B. signed the bail-bond, and it was held that
they could jointly maintain an action on the promise. In these
cases there is no difficulty in discovering an intention to benefit
the third person. And yet this exception seems not now to be
recognised in England : Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393.
Even in Massachusetts the tendency is to narrow the exception
and adhere more rigidly to the rule: -Exchange Bank v. Rice,
107 Mass. 39.
It seems to us that the exception to the rule is a reasonable
one, and should prevail.
The question then recurs, is the case at bar within the exception ?
We have already expressed our views as to the ,nature of the
contract and the real interest of the parties. If we are right it
is clear that the question must be answered in the negative.
That the incidental advantage to the creditor (if it is an advantage
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to have his debt paid by one man rather than another), is not such
a benefit As the exception contemplates, is apparent from 5, consideration of the possible and even probable consequences of holding
it to be so. The case before us affords a good illustration. The
debtor is insolvent, and the property mortgaged has largely
depreciated, so that it fails to pay the debt. Now if the plaintiffs may recover the balance of the defendant, they have a
security for their debt which they did not originally have, which
they never contracted for, and which the contracting parties did
not intend that they should have. It in effect makes him the
absolute guarantor of the debt.
Whatever doubt may have existed as to the state of the law in
New York on this subject it seems to be set at rest, for the present
at least, by recent decisions.
In Garnsey v. Boyers, 47 N. Y. 233, which was an action like
this, the court says, RAPALLO, J. : "I do not understand that the

case of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 288, has gone so far as to hold
that every promise made by one person to another, from the performance of which a third would derive a benefit, gives a right of
action to such third party, he being neither privy to the contract
nor the consideration. To entitle him to an action the contract
must have been made for his benefit. He must be the person
intended to be benefited." Again, "If such a contract could be
enforced by the creditor, who would be incidentally benefited by
its performance, every agreement by which one party should
agree with another, for a consideration moving from him, to
become security for him to his creditors or to advance money to
pay his debts, could be enforced by the parties whose claims are
thus to be secured or paid. I do not understand any case to have
gone this length."
The case of M]ferrill v. Green, 55 N. Y. 270, was this: Roberts
and Green were partners. They dissolved and Green and one
Nichols executed a bond to Roberts, conditioned that Green
should pay all the partnership debts. In a suit on the bond by a
creditor it was held that creditors could not sue. GROVER, J.,
says: " Green was liable with Roberts for the payment of the
firm debts. He agreed with Roberts upon a valid consideration
to assume the payment of the whole of the debts, and Nichols
undertook that he should perform this contract. This was no agreement made by Green and Nichols with the creditors or for their

